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We analyse why some merger and acquisitions (M&A) deals are withdrawn
paying particular attention to the economic freedom and legal environment of
countries. We use a large dataset based on deals worldwide from over 140 coun-
tries during the period 1977–2014. Our core finding is that the likelihood of a
deal's withdrawal tends to increase if the economic freedom/quality of legal
environment of the acquiring (target) firm's country is higher (lower). These
core findings matter more for the non-financial sector, during non-crisis years,
and in developed financial markets. We also report that the deals have higher
tendency to be withdrawn if the target firm's size is larger or its profitability is
lower; and the acquiring firm's size is smaller. Furthermore, our analyses
reveal that deal characteristics (i.e., deal attitude, means of payment, deal size,
ownership sought) also matter in affecting the outcome of announced M&A
deals.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The business world witnessed over 50,000 mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) transactions worldwide only in 2018,
with the total value of over 3.9 trillion U.S. dollars (The
Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances). A
burgeoning academic literature highlights the impor-
tance of deciding on M&As in affecting corporate res-
tructuring, efficiency, performance, and growth (see
e.g., Caiazza & Pozzolo, 2016; Liu, 2019; Renneboog &
Vansteenkiste, 2019). The decision makers in these M&A
deals assess substantial information (e.g., financial rec-
ommendations, sunk costs, revaluations, country charac-
teristics, termination fee, negotiation criteria, and
expected synergies) either to complete or withdraw a deal
during the negotiation process. This set of information
allows them to balance potential risks and assess the
costs and benefits of M&A deals.
Junni, Sarala, Tarba, and Weber (2015) emphasize
that the main factors affecting the outcome of acquisi-
tions can be attributed to the characteristics of firms' tan-
gible resources and their intangible assets such as
managerial skills and capabilities and knowledge base.
M&A activities involve a lot of scrutiny during the due
diligence process (involving M&A advisors, consultants,
analysts, and decision makers) and their completion is an
indicator that both the bidder and the target are satisfied
with the inputs, process, and outputs of the M&As trans-
actions. However, it is not clear why some decision
makers withdraw an announced deal by exercising the
exit option. Consequently, we investigates the various
factors behind this exit option of rejecting a deal
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announced: this angle is important because the M&A lit-
erature typically focused on the accounting and market
performance of completed deals (see e.g., Amewu &
Alagidede, 2018; Ferreira, Santos, de Almeida, &
Reis, 2014; Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & Stevens, 2015) but
understudied the determining factors affecting the suc-
cess rates of the M&As deal announcements (see
e.g., Ahammad, Tarba, Liu, Glaister, & Cooper, 2016;
Caiazza & Pozzolo, 2016; Friedman, Carmeli, Tishler, &
Shimizu, 2016 and Zhou, Xie, & Wang, 2016 acknowledg-
ing this gap in the literature).
Institutional theory conjectures that, similar to their
effects on the survival of corporations, the failure and suc-
cess of M&A deals are directly influenced by the institu-
tional environment of the home and host countries (see
North, 1990; Scott, 1995 and the discussion in Zhang,
Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). This theory also highlights the
motivating factors for acquiring firms via institutional
pressures and the norms of their business environments as
well as the regulatory barriers (Oliver, 1990; Zucker, 1977).
According to Tirole (2006), M&A deals are likely to be
withdrawn when companies perceive that they cannot
move assets from low to high productivity (efficiency the-
ory). The higher the degrees of freedom in terms of assets
efficiency and the better the competitive advantages, the
more value an M&As deal can create for shareholders. Nev-
ertheless, there are other perspectives that might affect
deals' withdrawal; for instance, when an acquirer reveals
managerial entrenchment (agency theory) (Ambrose &
Megginson, 1992; Jensen, 1988), misvaluation problems
(hubris theory) (Roll, 1986), managers conduct value-
destroying acquisitions to extract private benefits (Masulis,
Wang, & Xie, 2009) or a target becomes better positioned
during a negotiation (Weston, Mitchell, & Mulherin, 2004).
The literature approached the deal completions issue
at different angles. For example, Kau, Linck, and
Rubin (2008) focus on companies' market returns; Barros
and Dominguez (2013) and Dauber (2012) assess post-
merger synergies; Pablo (2009), Rossi and Volpin (2004),
Teerikangas (2012) and Wang and Wang (2012) analyse
cross-border determinants; Faccio and Masulis (2005),
Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) and Ismail (2011) study
the means of payments; Jandik, Lallemand, and
McCumber (2017) examine the value-return relevance of
debt issuance for failed takeovers; Branch, Wang, and
Yang (2008) focus on the estimation methods; Phalippou,
Xu, and Zhao (2015) examine the U.S. M&As with the
perspective of neo-agency theory of takeovers; and
Liu (2016) shows that failed takeover attempts in the
USA could be “wake-up calls” for the underperforming
managers of target firms. On the other hand, Reddy, Xie,
and Huang's (2016) case study analysis shows that the
institutional and political background factors exert
considerable influence on the completion rates of cross-
border M&As. When firms' prospects are unclear, infor-
mation is incomplete, expectations do not match, and
high negotiation power around targets influencing the
acquisition premium, a deal announced is susceptible to
a withdrawal. Indeed, Puranam, Powell, and Singh (2006)
stress that a deal withdrawal uncovers problems faced
during the due diligence. Bearing the efficiency theory in
mind, this study assesses how target- and acquirer-
specific characteristics, exposed during the due diligence
or negotiation process, might exert influence on decision
makers to withdraw a deal announced.
Given the critical roles of country characteristics
(Caiazza & Pozzolo, 2016), our main research question is:
are the cross-border M&A deals' withdrawals related to the
quality of the economic freedom and legal environment of
the related countries? Capron and Guillén (2009) relate
the economic freedom to country perceptions
(e.g., regulation, property rights, and investor protection),
which matters for assets restructuring, deals transactions,
and growth strategies.1 Despite the multiple approaches
to analyse a given country, aggregate indices help to iden-
tify the quality of a country in terms of its economic free-
dom (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2011; Gwartney,
Lawson, & Hall, 2015; Spamann, 2009).
To our best knowledge, there has been no discussion
about the economic freedom and the legal aspects in the
M&A literature as a central aspect for calling off the
announced deals. Furthermore, the recent research has
approached bid failures analysing only market price infor-
mation, particularly in the USA. Namely, Kau et al. (2008)
investigate whether decision makers learn from stock
prices to call off investments, and Jacobsen (2014) assesses
deals where the purchase price of a target becomes too
high and scrutinizes on different types of deals' withdrawal
(i.e., “restrains withdrawal” due to market influence, or
“other withdrawal” due to regulatory, judicial and mate-
rial changes) to evaluate CEOs' quality. Dutordoir,
Roosenboom, and Vasconcelos (2014) and Zaheer, Cas-
tañer, and Souder (2013) also evaluate deal failures focus-
ing on the expected realization of synergies on deals
completed. Caiazza and Pozzolo (2016) focus on the bank-
ing sector only when they examine deal failures.
Ahammad, Leone, Tarba, Glaister, and Arslan (2017) dis-
cuss the level of equity ownership sought by the British
firms in the cross-border M&As, and they imply that a fea-
sible level can mitigate the intricacies that would reduce
the chance of a successful deal. Further, Zhou et al. (2016)
examine the completion likelihood of cross-border M&As
from/to Brazil, Russia, India and China.
Our paper reports two key findings. First, an increase
in the target firm's country economic freedom index and
the legal environment quality tends to reduce the
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probability of M&A deals being withdrawn. Second, if
this index or the quality of legal aspects increases for the
acquiring firm's country, then the propensity of cancel-
ling the deal goes up. We also provide analyses across
various sub-samples. Following Pablo (2009) and Di
Guardo, Marrocu, and Paci (2016), our evidence suggests
that the acquirers are more aware of M&A risks, informa-
tion asymmetries, and economic conditions to evaluate
takeover strategies. Our analyses further show that if the
deal attitude is classified as friendly, hostile, or neutral,
then the odds of a failed M&A deal would be reduced.
However, the marginal effects calculations show that the
lowest magnitude of odds of a deal's withdrawal is associ-
ated with a hostile attitude. This is aligned with
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006), among others, who
found that friendly bidders, using high share-market rat-
ings, destroyed more value than unfriendly bidders.
Moreover, this study observes that the size and profitabil-
ity of the target and acquiring firms exert some influence
on the withdrawal decisions. Finally, we report that the
tendency to withdraw the M&A deals increases if the deal
is large in size, if it is offered to be financed through
stocks, or if the ownership sought by the acquirer is high.
Therefore, our contributions are briefly as follows:
(a) we extend the M&As literature by focusing on the
failed deals; (b) we examine not only the role of deal char-
acteristics (i.e., deal attitude, means of payments, deal size,
capital structure, and ownership) but also the different
proxies of firm size and financial performance and effects
of economic freedom level of countries as well as the legal
aspects; and iii) additional to the institutional theory
aspects, our results are also related to the resource-based
(Barney, 1991) and knowledge-based (Kogut & Zander,
1992) views via human and social capital.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature. Section 3 formulates the hypotheses. In Sec-
tion 4, we provide the methodology, and in Section 5,
empirical results are discussed. Section 6 provides conclu-
sions and implications of the empirical findings for both
theory and practice.
2 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
ON DEALS' WITHDRAWALS
Withdrawing a deal is an exit option where either an
acquirer or a target refuses to go ahead with a bid
announced. Some researchers attempted to figure out
directly (i.e., prices and valuations) or indirectly
(i.e., preferences and expectations) as to why some M&A
deals fail. Directly, deals could fail by unsatisfactory price
offers from a bidder to a target, which can also be associ-
ated with CEOs' lack of experience in takeover strategies
(Jacobsen, 2014), under-confidence about a target's valua-
tions (Roll, 1986), and negative reactions to stock prices
movements of the incumbent companies (Kau
et al., 2008). Indirectly, deals could be withdrawn because
of dissimilar means of payments preferences among deci-
sion makers (Faccio & Masulis, 2005; Gorbenko &
Malenko, 2014; Walter & Barney, 1990), mismatch on the
ownership structure sought between buyers and large tar-
gets' shareholders (Bajo, Barbi, Bigelli, & Hillier, 2013),
and large deviations between expected and realized syn-
ergies (Garzella & Fiorentino, 2014). Therefore, we argue
that under the theory of efficiency (Tirole, 2006)—by
which takeover strategies help companies to add new
technologies, improve their corporate governance mecha-
nisms, and become more efficient and effective in manag-
ing their resources—decision makers can abandon them
if they perceive that the assets' movement from low to
high productivity is not feasible. Namely, the M&A costs
surpass the benefits, especially when acquirers pay
higher premia to convince target shareholders.
Faccio and Masulis (2005) acknowledge the influence
of financial choices (i.e., mean of payments) and firm size,
mentioning that large acquirers have more degree of diver-
sification and less insolvency problems; consequently, they
can complete their bids straightforwardly (i.e., lower ten-
dency for withdrawals). However, does this outcome hold
for larger targets? In fact, Gorbenko and Malenko (2014)
argue that large targets require mostly cash deals to avoid
acquirers' shares misvaluation, and the acquirers do not
have sufficient cash to finance large cash payments. Then,
large targets are more problematic to be acquired, and
M&A deals are more likely to be withdrawn.
Behr and Heid (2011) found for the banking sector
that small targets are more likely to be acquired because
of the easy realization of scale economies. Nevertheless,
Baker and Wurgler (2006) and McNichols and Stub-
ben (2015) mention that small targets are challenging to
value because of their irregular cash flows, sales volatil-
ity, high weight on intangibles assets, among other
aspects. It thus emerges that the nexus on target firms'
size and deal withdrawal propensity remains a puzzle.
Other studies argue that deals can also be cancelled
because of external factors (e.g., level of regulation, prop-
erty rights, and government intervention) (Moschieri &
Campa, 2014; Pablo, 2009), or weak financial figures
observed during the due diligence in terms of revenues
enhancements, accounting returns, among other aspects
(Adolph, Gillies, & Krings, 2006; Mukherjee, Kiymaz, &
Baker, 2004). Di Guardo et al. (2016), on the other hand,
relate the country-level corruption to the mode of cross-
border M&As.
The literature uses firm size either as a primary or
control variable and defines it differently and reports
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conflicting results.2 Despite this, it is argued that larger
acquirers tend to withdraw less often because of their inher-
ent level of diversification (Faccio & Masulis, 2005), econo-
mies of scale (Behr & Heid, 2011), and partnering
experience (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1995). On the other
hand, Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) argue that large target
firms require mostly cash deals, which may be problematic
because of the acquirers' potential cash constraints. Rossi
and Volpin (2004) also identify that target firms with larger
size have a negative impact on M&As activity because their
size diminishes the takeover premium. Bajo et al. (2013)
state that managers and shareholders of such firms are con-
cerned about losing ownership and control, which would
make deals more likely to fail. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984)
and Beitel, Schiereck, and Wahrenburg (2004) state that
small targets can reduce acquisition costs and are less com-
plex to capture the potential synergies, which implies that
such aspects facilitate takeovers. Nevertheless, smaller tar-
gets can be exposed to valuation problems (Baker &
Wurgler, 2006; McNichols & Stubben, 2015) because there
is less information access and more adverse selection on
company valuations (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo,-
2011). Overall, the literature emphasizes the difficulties of
working with large targets mainly because of the high take-
over premium required and the concerns about ownership
and control.
During due diligence, decision makers gather opera-
tional, financial, and market information about the incum-
bent firms. While they review the companies' resources,
revenues, costs and expenses, the scrutiny of the financial
records are the first steps to align decision makers' expecta-
tions and visualize the likely synergies (Epstein, 2005).
According to Garzella and Fiorentino (2014), synergies,
expectations and realizations play an important role in
M&As studies. Consequently, the higher the synergies, the
higher the shareholder value due to assets productivity
(Tirole, 2006).
Martin and Shalev (2017) indicate that the announced
returns (operating performance) of both the acquirer and
the target can serve as indicators of acquisition efficiency,
assuming that they could capture the expected surplus of
deals. Consequently, corporate profitability should also
provide information for the optimality of exit options.
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) argue that positive com-
pany prospects enhance future cash flows through syner-
gies. Hence, acquirers might be willing to look for
combined synergies through M&As to improve their
financial prospects. Rossi and Volpin (2004) consider that
target firms' size has adverse effects on M&As activities
because of lower takeover premia. Further, when targets
show higher profitability, this might not only increase
their negotiation power but also reduces expected syner-
gies through the takeover premia.
The resource-based and knowledge-based views are
relevant to our research objectives in the following way:
cross-border acquisition entails complex strategic endeav-
ours that require combinations of unique knowledge,
skills-sets and experience (Dikova, Sahib, & Van
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014).
Nadolska and Barkema (2014) argue that executives
develop these unique sets of expertise and capabilities as
they learn the optimal type and the number of firms to
acquire and how to time each individual acquisition. The
capabilities, skills and experience require managing
acquisition programmes are governed by knowledge shar-
ing among the top management team (TMT). The authors
further argue that firms that are successful in their acqui-
sition projects usually have TMTs that mainly draw from
their unique, rare expertise and experience. Thus, the best
acquirers appear to apply their skills and expertise from
organizational learning (Dikova et al., 2010; Jandik
et al., 2017). However, the extent of their learning is
influenced by combinations of knowledge base (TMT
unique skills and experience) and the resources capabili-
ties of the firms, which directly affects the decision mak-
ing process of the target and acquirer TMTs.
The completion rates of M&A deals can also be attrib-
uted to the role of managerial opportunism and informa-
tion asymmetries (Feito-Ruiz, Fernández, & Menéndez-
Requejo, 2014). The related literature suggests that if the
stock ownership concentration of the acquiring firms is
low, it would be an opportunity for the incumbent man-
agers to extract private benefits via new acquisitions (see
Chang, 1998; Chen, Harford, & Li, 2007; Officer, 2007;
Officer, Poulsen, & Stegemoller, 2009). For the agency con-
flicts perspective (see e.g., Chen & Young, 2010; Kroll,
Wright, Toombs, & Leavell, 1997), managerial opportun-
ism would not be a significant concern for the target share-
holders as long as the acquiring firms adopt effective
corporate governance mechanisms. Cuypers, Cuypers, and
Martin (2017) raise a similar issue when they study the
importance of information asymmetry between acquirers
and targets in value creation through M&As. Cheng and
Yang (2017) as well emphasize the relevance of uncer-
tainty and environmental turbulence in the performance
of cross-border M&As. Moreover, Kang (2006) highlights
the importance of effective monitoring during the acquisi-
tion process, especially in cases of unstable and dynamic
environmental complexity stemming from severe competi-
tion and symbiotic interdependence. This occurs because
in these situations both the information asymmetry and
conflicts between TMTs and outside investors heighten,
which has direct implications on assessing the value of
announced M&A deals. Our empirical analyses consider
this important dimension by using some country-specific
factors such as economic freedom index, underdeveloped
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financial markets, quality of institutions, legal protection
and property rights (see e.g., Feito-Ruiz et al., 2014; La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). It is
important to note that Feito-Ruiz et al. (2014) clearly
explain and hypothesize the association between manage-
rial opportunism and decisions on M&A deals within the
framework of the rule of law, investor protection, and the
level of financial markets' development.
3 | HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The location of the target and acquiring firms matters for
assets restructuring, deals transactions, and growth strate-
gies, and hence for the completion of deals (Chikhouni
et al., 2017; Yang & Hyland, 2012; Yildiz, 2014; Capron &
Guillén, 2009). These issues are related to factors associ-
ated with economic freedom and country-level consider-
ations (e.g., cultural distance, regulations, property rights,
the rule of law, government intervention, and investor
protection). Further, Tunyi and Ntim (2016) highlight the
importance of the institutional environment regarding the
M&As deals in Africa. This suggests that some locations
are more attractive than others for the M&As deals and
growth opportunities (Moschieri & Campa, 2014), and the
efficient movement of corporate resources (Rossi &
Volpin, 2004). Similarly, cultural differences, institutional
heterogeneities and clashes between countries can be
important challenges for the completion of cross-border
deals or post-acquisition performance (Huang, Zhu, &
Brass, 2017; Weber, Tarba, & Reichel, 2009).
There are some indicators that help decision makers
to assess the quality of countries: anti-director rights
index (Spamann, 2009), corruption index (Mauro, 1998),
Dow Jones economic freedom (Pablo, 2009), economic
freedom index of the world (EWF) (Gwartney
et al., 2015), among others. EWF relies on four pillars:
freedom regarding personal choices, exchange coordina-
tion across markets, free entrance and competition, and
people protection and property rights. According to
Gwartney et al. (2015), countries enhancing the men-
tioned pillars are more open to engage in voluntarily
transactions (e.g., M&As deals). In fact, when analysing
takeover strategies, some studies have evaluated the
effect of some country-level factors on incumbents' deci-
sions. For instance, Moschieri and Campa (2014) and
Rossi and Volpin (2004) claim that regulatory boundaries
affects negatively M&As activities; and particularly,
Pablo (2009), evaluating cross-border deals in Latin-
American countries, finds that: (a) targets' government
intervention, regulation, property rights, and foreign
investment, and (b) acquirers' property rights, reduces
the likelihood of cross-border transactions.
The evidence shows that the acquiring country's low
level property rights negatively impact cross-border com-
pletions (Pablo, 2009). However, when their shareholder
rights are stronger, then the post-acquisition reorganiza-
tions weaken (Capron & Guillén, 2009). We argue that the
economic freedom level of the acquirers' country can be
considered as a risk if it is deemed as too high depending
on whether countries have strict legal systems in terms of
property rights, bureaucracy, sound money, international
trade and other corporate sector regulations.
Nyström (2008) also refers to the political and economic
prerequisites to obtain high scores and argues that these
macro environments would exert influence on micro envi-
ronments (such as firms' decisions). Further, Levie and
Autio (2011) highlight the impact of institutions and bur-
densome business regulations on strategic entrepreneurial
behaviours. This aspect is relevant because acquirers tend
to be more constrained by the home-country regulations
and stricter due diligence to complete M&A deals and
information disclosure to shareholders, authorities and
public, in contrast to the targets' institutional background.
Our first hypothesis is thus as follows:
Hypothesis 1 The higher the acquirer's country economic
freedom, the more likely is the deal's withdrawal.
Regarding the target firms' country factors and M&As
deals, Pablo (2009), assessing 835 cross-border transac-
tions in Latin America (1998–2004), finds that govern-
ment intervention and regulations affect the likelihood of
cross-border deals negatively. Hijzen, Görg, and Man-
chin (2008), analysing 23 OECD countries and 21,234
cross-border deals (1990–2001), reveal that multilateral
trade costs functioning as barriers between an acquirer
and a target reduce the number of completed cross-
border mergers. In addition, Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-
Requejo (2011), including 469 M&As of European listed
firms (2002–2006), emphasize that less economic freedom
and law enforcement in the targets' countries increase
acquirers' business risk and reduce their potential gains,
providing early warnings to withdraw the announced
transactions. Hence, we formulate the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The higher the target's economic freedom,
the less likely is the deal's withdrawal.
4 | METHODOLOGY
4.1 | Sample background
To introduce the relevance of deal withdrawals, Figure 1
shows the worldwide trend of M&As activities. It
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illustrates the average value of completed or withdrawn
deals, and the percentage of deals withdrawn across the
years. This figure reveals that although the proportion of
withdrawals over total deals announced has decreased,
their average value has been higher than the value of
completed deals and the gap is widening (see also
Table 3).
A synopsis in Table 1 reveals that the underlying rea-
sons for the failed M&As deals are unsettled. This table
further shows that some transactions are based on cash
or cash and stocks combined as payment methods with
deals quantified by monetary units or percentage of
shares sought, and involve domestic or cross-border
negotiations under different economic and regulations
perspectives. Moreover, there are deals with a friendly or
a hostile attitude that consist of either large acquirers or
large targets.
Unlike the previous studies related to M&As deals
(Bajo et al., 2013; Garzella & Fiorentino, 2014;
Jacobsen, 2014; Pablo, 2009), we take into consideration
the full perspective and classification of the M&As activi-
ties provided by Thomson Reuters One Banker. Table 2
and notes therein show the information about the num-
ber of deals disclosed and classified according to their sta-
tus and types.
4.2 | Data
Our paper takes into account a large number of deals and
firm-specific information such as deal attitude, means of
payments, country-and industry-specific differences, and
the method of integration. The nature of our dataset is in
line with Tunyi and Ntim's (2016) suggestion that M&As
studies with both firm- and country-level data can have
more robust results. The original sample available con-
tains 186,640 deals disclosed on 147 countries and across
137 criteria related to deal status, year of announcement,
legal aspects, mean of payments, deal attitude, deal
values, regions, and financial attributes. The deals take
into account bidders from both public and private
targeting listed companies and transactions with status
completed or withdrawn. The timeframe includes bids
that took place from January 1977 to December 2014
obtained from Thomson One Banker. After correcting
the sample from data anomalies on the deal status
(i.e., missing, null, blanks, duplicates, and unavailable
information), the dataset with further filtering includes
137,116 deals.3 Although our univariate analyses are
based on this final dataset, for the regression analyses the
sample size (9,812 deals) is much smaller due to the non-
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Millions USD 
(Real Prices 1982=100) 
Withdrawn Deal value (mean $mil)
Years
Completed Deal value (mean $mil) Withdrawn Percentage by year
FIGURE 1 Average deal values by deals completed and withdrawn, in real U.S. prices, and percentage of withdrawals by years
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characteristics (i.e., the number of observations is differ-
ent for each variable) and ensuring that the target firm
and the acquirer are not from the same country. From
the total deals announced (Table 2), note that more than
82% of the transactions are associated with acquisitions
of partial interest, acquisition of assets, and mergers.
4.3 | Variables
4.3.1 | Economic freedom index
There are different approaches relating economic free-
dom perspectives to the likelihood of making strategic
investments but they differ in terms of the criteria used
(e.g., protection, law enforcement, investor rights) and
locations assessed. For instance, La Porta et al. (1998); La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) eval-
uate legal systems for studying dividends and depth of
capital markets; Martynova and Renneboog (2008) link
the shareholder orientation level differences in the bid-
der's and target's county to the value of expected synergy.
Rossi and Volpin (2004) analyse the role of shareholder
protections in M&As deals for the United States and
United Kingdom; and Pablo (2009) considers government
intervention, regulation, property rights, among others
aspects for cross-border deals in Latin America.
Certainly, the country aspects mentioned in Rossi
and Volpin (2004) and Pablo (2009) are only one of the
components of the full perspective of economic free-
dom. However, Spamann (2009) highlights the advan-
tage of working with a composite index that synthesizes
multiple variables. Using composite indicators combin-
ing different criteria would be a more robust way to
analyse the likelihood of the withdrawal of M&As
deals, especially because they provide a full perspective
of the economic stability of a given country (Gwartney
et al., 2015).
The literature mentions some indicators like the eco-
nomic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation
(Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2011; Liang &
Renneboog, 2017) and the Anti-Director Right Index
(Spamann, 2009). Similar to Nyström (2008), among
others, our paper uses the Economic Freedom of the
World index (EFW) from the Fraser Institute, which—
according to Gwartney et al. (2015)—EFW mitigates the
probable dispersion of interrelated criteria and enhances
a full perspective of the economic freedom of a country.
Furthermore, it considers a global approach to see when
decision makers (investors, shareholders, and stake-
holders) feel more protected by institutions to be able to
exercise voluntary transactions without harming others
(incumbents or property). EFW consistently ranks
157 countries and territories, and for over 100 locations
tracking back to 1970s.
Another key point is that EWF synthetizes five
major country-level perspectives (i.e., size of govern-
ment, legal system and security of property rights,
sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and reg-
ulation) across 24 economic freedom criteria (e.g., law
enforcement, regulation, inflation, capital convertibility
and business perspectives) (Gwartney et al., 2015). The
information for EFW is set and contrasted against other
sources, such as the International Country Risk Guide,
the Global Competitiveness Report, and the World
Bank's Doing Business Project, European Values Study,
the Policy Research Institute of Market Economy, Insti-
tute of Economic Affairs, and other international orga-
nizations. Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2008) called for alternative measures for share-
holders protection in future studies on M&A deals. The
use of the economic freedom index can be a response
to this call.
TABLE 1 Summary of deal synopsis about M&A activity
[2000: US] - Deutsche Telekom AG (DT) acquired (completed)
VoiceStream Wireless Corp (VS), a provider of commercial
and personal cellular and communication services, in a stock
and cash combination. DT offered $15.7 billion in cash and
3.67 ordinary shares per VS share. VS' board classified this
cross-border deal under a friendly attitude.
[2001: US] - Hewlett-Packard Co (HP) acquired (completed) all
the outstanding common stock of Compaq Computer Corp
(CC), a manufacturer of personal computers, in a stock swap
transaction (cash and stock combination) valued at $25.3
billion. HP offered 0.63 common shares per CC share. Upon
completion, HP shareholders held 64% of the combined
company, while CC shareholders held the remaining 36%
stake. Concurrently, both CC and HP, located in the United
States, adopted shareholder rights plans to protect the merger
agreement from third party interference.
[2007: UK] - Delta (Two) Ltd of Qatar withdrew its plans to
acquire 75% of interest, or 1.31 billion ordinary shares, which
it did not already own, in J Sainsbury PLC, a London-based
retailer of food, home and garden products, for 6 British
pounds ($12.296 US) in cash per ordinary share, or a total
value of £7.84 billion ($16.06 billion).
[2007: HUNGARY] - OMV AG of Germany withdrew its plans
to launch a hostile offer to acquire the remaining 79.8%
interest, or 87.3 million ordinary shares, which OMV AG did
not already own, in MOL Magyar Olaj, a Budapest-based oil
and gas exploration and production company, for 32,000
Hungarian forints (€127.758/$180.704) in cash. The
transaction was subject to regulatory approvals according to
the target country's specifications.
Note: Source: Authors' own assessment based on Reuters Thomson
One Banker.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL.
4.3.2 | Deal characteristics
The deal characteristics, targets' idiosyncrasies, and control
variables used in this paper follow the previous studies on
M&As (see e.g., Amewu & Alagidede, 2018; Phalippou
et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2016). We consider deals' attitude
(i.e., hostile, friendly or neutral) during negotiations as
Moschieri and Campa (2014) state that gentle approaches
produce more deal completions. Gorbenko and
Malenko (2014) and Moschieri and Campa (2014) contend
that stock payments are mostly exposed to probable mis-
pricing and unavoidable shared risks between a target and
an acquirer, particularly when stock payments are used
during the negotiation. Thus, we employ dummy variables
for payment methods (i.e., cash, stock or hybrid pay-
ments). Location perspectives allow us not only differenti-
ating domestic (national) deals from transnational (cross-
border) counterparts, but also controlling during the esti-
mations when the targets and acquirers are located in the
same country (i.e., addressing the likely differential
between economic freedom indices across two countries in
the regression models). Cross-border deals reveal more
about countries' heterogeneities (i.e., macroeconomic con-
ditions, regulation issues, capital convertibility) (Hijzen
et al., 2008; Pablo, 2009). Hence, this study controls these
characteristics with a dummy variable. Moreover, we con-
sider whether the M&As deals are related to different (ver-
tical) or similar sectors (horizontal) with another binary
dummy variable. We also control for deal size since the
larger the deal values; the more complex are the transac-
tions (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). This study further takes
into account the percentage of shares sought by the
acquirer (Zhou et al., 2016).
4.3.3 | Firm characteristics
We examine whether the profitability levels of target and
acquiring firms play a role in affecting the outcome of
the intended M&A deals. Decision makers and M&As
analysts throughout the due diligence process gather and
revise systematically, operational, financial, and account-
ing information, among other aspects. They are highly
concerned about firms' resources, revenues, costs and
expenses (Epstein, 2005). For example, firms with very
low profitability ratios reveal their vulnerability to the
market as this suggests high operating expenses and/or
inefficient use of assets, which can make them ideal tar-
gets. Similarly, firms with very high profitability might
accumulate cash to acquire other companies. Our other
consideration is whether it would be too difficult to reject
a deal if it is attached to a very large acquirer or the target






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL. 13
Humphrey (1997) raise similar concerns for the banking
sector.
Regarding profitability, Dietrich and Sorensen (1984)
analyse post-announcement withdrawals; Pablo (2009)
assesses the determinants of cross-border deals, and Mar-
tin and Shalev (2017) explore the likelihood of mergers,
and in so doing they consider corporate-level profitabil-
ity. Some scholars particularly consider earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)
over total assets as a profitability measure (Feito-Ruiz &
Menéndez-Requejo, 2011; Pablo, 2009). Our paper not
only uses this definition but also consider the alternative
definition of net income over total assets.
Regarding firm size, in M&As studies, size is mea-
sured by market value (Martin & Shalev, 2017), number
of employees (Buehler et al., 2006), total assets (Barros &
Dominguez, 2013; Behr & Heid, 2011; Faccio &
Masulis, 2005) or total sales (Amihud et al., 1990;
TABLE 5 Univariate analysis: characteristics of completed and withdrawn deals
Completed Withdrawn Completed vs. Withdrawn
N Mean Median N Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon
Acquirer freedom 130,375 7.804 7.900 4,599 7.809 8.00 −0.513 −3.759***
Target freedom 131,459 7.681 7.800 4,631 7.691 7.900 −0.827 −4.113***
Legal protection (acquirer) 113,517 6.907 7 3,304 6.952 7.100 −1.625 −1.8343
Legal protection (target) 114,481 6.666 6.800 3,315 6.725 6.900 −1.963 −1.6946
Property rights (acquirer) 113,383 7.568 7.800 3,297 7.483 7.800 3.7*** 3.3497***
Property rights (target) 114,034 7.314 7.700 3,299 7.222 7.600 3.466*** 3.2552***
Acquirer underdeveloped 131,122 0.0304 0 4,633 0.0419 0 −4.44*** −4.4398***
Target underdeveloped 132,433 0.0486 0 4,683 0.0630 0 −4.473*** −4.4731***
M&A waves 132,434 0.596 1 4,684 0.607 1 −1.476 −1.4764
Crisis 132,434 0.161 0 4,684 0.152 0 1.652 1.6515
Acquirer size_assets 65,100 218.1 21 2,531 221.1 25.81 −0.141 −3.726***
Target size_assets 25,994 53.65 1.990 2,088 86.97 7.743 −3.34** −22.433***
Acquirer size_sales 65,491 58.96 13.82 2,521 68.17 14.66 −1.827 −1.146
Target size_sales 35,144 10.36 0.723 2,292 18.44 3.896 −7.113*** −28.496***
Acquirer profitability_EBITDA 64,221 0.0830 0.111 2,470 0.0615 0.1020 0.221 4.500***
Target profitability_EBITDA 19,686 0.0691 0.0880 1,759 0.0910 0.0922 −0.592 −2.178**
Acquirer profitability_net income 64,969 0.0054 0.0433 2,525 −0.0441 0.0377 0.452 5.159***
Target profitability_net income 24,619 −1.270 0.0251 2044 0.0135 0.0277 −0.292 −1.109
Friendly 132,432 0.910 1 4,684 0.760 1 34.55*** 34.402***
Hostile 132,432 0.0012 0 4,684 0.0502 0 −62.86*** −61.975***
Neutral 132,432 0.0632 0 4,684 0.0515 0 3.252** 3.252***
Cash 132,432 0.221 0 4,684 0.257 0 −5.941*** −5.941***
Stock 132,432 0.0315 0 4,684 0.0700 0 −14.53*** −14.517***
Hybrid 132,432 0.0195 0 4,684 0.0470 0 −13.07*** −13.066***
Cross-border 132,432 0.437 0 4,684 0.427 0 1.442 1.442
Vertical 132,432 0.392 0 4,684 0.323 0 9.514*** 9.511***
Deal size 64,362 1.997 0.277 2,576 9.711 1.5570 −31.26*** −37.098***
Ownership 124,407 0.778 1 3,976 0.818 1 −7.262*** −4.025***
Liquidity 21,079 0.169 0.0833 1,778 0.136 0.0756 0.873 3.033***
Leverage 19,760 0.349 0.2444 1,835 0.294 0.2492 0.556 −1.306
Note: All monetary values are in constant U.S. prices (1982 = 100). The consumer price index (CPI) data gathered from the U.S. Department
of Labour Bureau of Labour Statistics. The t-statistic (Z-statistic; Wilcoxon signed negative ranks test) is for the mean (median) differences of
each variable between two groups. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL. 15
Pablo, 2009). In our study, we adopt the definitions based
on total sales and total assets adjusted for inflation.4
Other firm-level controls are leverage and liquidity of
assets as the latter examines the effect of excess liquidity
and likely inefficiency of asset allocations (Dietrich &
Sorensen, 1984). Also, we control for country-, industry-
and time-fixed effects (Faccio & Masulis, 2005;
Moschieri & Campa, 2014; Pablo, 2009). Table A1 in the
Appendix defines these variables.
4.4 | Estimation method
Previous M&As studies used logit/probit analyses for their
binary dummy dependent variable: likelihood of cross-
border deals (Moschieri & Campa, 2014; Pablo, 2009;
Phalippou et al., 2015; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), causes of
domestic versus international deals (Erel et al., 2012), pre-
dictions of merger targets (Dietrich & Sorensen, 1984),
determinants of acquisition attempts (Zhang et al., 2011).
We employ logit models to explore the determinants of the





where Pi is the probability of a deal i being withdrawn; Xi
is the vector of explanatory variables and controls (see
Section 4.3. for details); α is the constant term and βs are
estimable slope coefficients.5 All the firm-specific factors
are lagged by one period. The analyses consider only
three attitudes (i.e., Friendly, Hostile and Neutral) among
various deal attitudes and only three payments
(i.e., Cash, Stock and Hybrid) among various payment
methods in the same regression models as binary dummy
variables without causing any multicollinearity problem.
All regression analyses employ time (37) and industry
(15) dummy variables to control for year and industry
(see Table A2) fixed effects.
5 | RESULTS
5.1 | Univariate analysis
Table 4 reports two independent panels, that is, the corre-
lation matrix (Panel A) and summary statistics (Panel B).
To have the full picture from 137,116 deals, these panels
take into account the available information by pair vari-
ables (correlations analysis) or by a single variable
(descriptive statistics), noting that the regression analysis
considers those completed data points (without missing







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL. 17
are much larger than targets, and this size dispersion is
relatively high for the former. When the profitability is
based on EBITDA, acquirers are more profitable (8 vs.
7%); when it is based on net income, they are still more
profitable but the acquirers' (targets') profitability ratios
are down to 0.4% (−117%).6 On the other hand, the mean
values of the economic freedom index of the targets' and
acquirers' home countries are very similar (7.7 vs. 7.8). It
also appears that the largest proportion of deal perception
reported and means of payments considered are friendly
attitude (91%) and cash usage (22%), respectively.
In Table 5, the sample is divided into two groups
according to the deal status (completed or withdrawn) to
compare the mean and median values of the variables. It
is evident that the median differences for most of the var-
iables are statistically significant. As for the mean values,
the economic freedom indices, the size of acquirers, and
profitability ratios show no statistical significance across
the two sub-samples. However, the size of the target
firms is significantly smaller for the completed deals com-
pared to the case of withdrawn deals.
5.2 | Likelihood of withdrawal of deals
Table 6 presents the first set of our robust logit results
(both the coefficients and marginal effects). The evidence
related to the economic freedom index (i.e., Acquirer free-
dom) supports our Hypothesis 1 at the 1% significance
level. The respective positive marginal effect as a measure
for the economic significance is very high (between
31 and 37%). It is thus suggested that a higher economic
freedom index pertaining to an acquiring firm's country
increases the tendency to cancel the M&As deals. This
finding is consistent with Pablo (2009) who finds a nega-
tive link between acquires' property rights on cross-
border completions, and with the explanation of Feito-
Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2011) who mention that
strong protection and information transparency make
decision makers more aware about business risks and
acquisition costs. Consequently, deals get more sensitive
to public scrutiny strengthening the exit option in post-
announcement deals. Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and
Powell (2012) report that entrenched managers can capi-
talize on asymmetric information by looking for M&As
that offer them greater opportunity for securing their pri-
vate benefits. We extend their empirical findings by
showing that strong protection and information transpar-
ency provide decision makers adequate enlightenment
regarding business risks and acquisition costs thereby
cancelling the deals where appropriate. We also extend
La Porta et al.'s (1998, 2000) findings by examining why

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18 ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL.
TABLE 8 Factors influencing M&As deal withdrawals: alternatives to the economic freedom index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. Marginal effects Coeff. Marginal effects
Acquirer legal 0.310** 0.0179** 0.208* 0.0120*
(0.132) (0.00766) (0.122) (0.00705)
Target legal −0.327** −0.0189** −0.229* −0.0133*
(0.132) (0.00762) (0.119) (0.00689)
Acquirer size_assets −0.208*** −0.0120*** −0.206*** −0.0119***
(0.0378) (0.00216) (0.0378) (0.00216)
Target size_assets 0.205*** 0.0118*** 0.204*** 0.0118***
(0.0632) (0.00366) (0.0633) (0.00366)
Acquirer profitability_EBITDA 0.00837 0.000484 0.00904 0.000523
(0.0116) (0.000674) (0.0108) (0.000624)
Target profitability_EBITDA −0.0139 −0.000804 −0.0134 −0.000773
(0.0115) (0.000663) (0.0116) (0.000668)
Friendly −3.016*** −0.174*** −3.023*** −0.175***
(0.196) (0.0108) (0.196) (0.0108)
Hostile −0.442* −0.0256* −0.460* −0.0266*
(0.265) (0.0153) (0.265) (0.0153)
Neutral −3.524*** −0.204*** −3.529*** −0.204***
(0.292) (0.0166) (0.292) (0.0166)
Cash 0.0267 0.00155 0.0122 0.000708
(0.139) (0.00803) (0.138) (0.00801)
Stock 0.421*** 0.0243*** 0.418*** 0.0242***
(0.161) (0.00930) (0.160) (0.00930)
Hybrid −0.0397 −0.00229 −0.0439 −0.00254
(0.189) (0.0109) (0.188) (0.0109)
Cross-border 0.0243 0.00140 0.0251 0.00145
(0.134) (0.00774) (0.134) (0.00778)
Vertical 0.0469 0.00271 0.0397 0.00230
(0.141) (0.00813) (0.140) (0.00809)
Deal size 0.170*** 0.00984*** 0.169*** 0.00977***
(0.0654) (0.00377) (0.0653) (0.00377)
Ownership 0.0113*** 0.000654*** 0.0113*** 0.000652***
(0.00263) (0.000152) (0.00262) (0.000152)
Leverage −0.0575 −0.00333 −0.0531 −0.00307
(0.229) (0.0132) (0.227) (0.0131)
Constant −0.550 −0.187
(1.540) (1.420)
Observations 6,803 6,803 6,803 6,803
Pseudo R2 0.284 0.283
F/Wald statistic 805*** 804***
Note: The dependent variable is Withdrawn. Acquirer legal or Target legal is either Legal protection (Models 1 and 2) or Property rights
(Models 3 and 4) in the acquirer's or target's country of origin. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are in the
parentheses *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. Time, industry and country dummies are included in all models. All firm-specific factors are
measured for the year preceding the announcement year. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20 ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL.
stronger institutional settings. On the other hand, our
analysis fails to confirm Hypothesis 2 as the respective
coefficient estimates (i.e., Target freedom) are all insignifi-
cant. However, the signs on the coefficient estimates are
as expected.7
We further reveal that the probability of a deal's fail-
ure increases with the larger size of the target, but it
decreases with the smaller size of the acquirer. This evi-
dence is aligned with Faccio and Masulis (2005) who
state that larger acquirers are more diversified, and with
Behr and Heid (2011) who argue that larger acquirers
can exploit better their economies of scale perspectives.
These results are also in line with Dietrich and
Sorensen (1984) and Beitel et al. (2004) who state that
larger targets increase the acquisition costs and the com-
plexity to capture the potential synergies.
Our results show that the financial performance of
the acquirers (i.e., Acquirer profitability_EBITDA) exerts
no significant influence on the propensity to reject M&As
deals. Similarly, our coefficient estimates related to the
profitability of the target firms (i.e., Target pro-
fitability_EBITDA) are negative and significant albeit at
the 10% level. An explanation for this is that targets get
more attractive when their accounting returns are higher.
Indeed, Garzella and Fiorentino (2014) note that syner-
gies expectations and realizations are essential for M&As
deals to create value for the shareholder. This approach
increases the chance of the deals' completion as decision
makers become more aware of the synergies enhance-
ment and more willing to complete the deal announced.
Regarding the other control variables, most of the
deal characteristics considered are consistent with previ-
ous studies. For instance, as suggested by Gorbenko and
Malenko (2014), the usage of shares as a mean of pay-
ments (i.e., Stock) augments the likelihood of deal with-
drawals, as reported by Chang (1998) and Martynova and
Renneboog (2009). However, this finding does not sup-
port Officer et al. (2009) who imply a negative link
because stock swap mitigates information asymmetries.
Observe also that the odds of deals withdrawn reduces
significantly under a friendly (Friendly, high marginal
effects around 17%), hostile (Hostile, marginal effects
around 3%) or neutral (Neutral, high marginal effects
around 20%) attitude, when they are compared to other
unsolicited or unclassified deals. This is partially aligned
to Moschieri and Campa (2014) who emphasize that gen-
tle approaches enhance better M&As negotiations. Fur-
thermore, the higher the deal size (Deal size) and the
higher the percentage of shares sought to purchase by the
acquirers (Ownership), the higher the likelihood of deal
withdrawal, with coefficients consistently significant at
the 1% level. These findings are supported by Grinstein



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22 ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL.
more managerial skills and effort in large deals; and by
Bajo et al. (2013) who note that changes in ownership
and control create distress and uncertainty on the deci-
sion makers. Finally, the other controls turn out not to
have significant effects on the M&A deals' withdrawal.
5.3 | Robustness checks
In this section, we provide some sensitivity analyses by
adopting alternative measures of the core explanatory vari-
ables and conduct regressions across various sub-samples.
First, we consider different definitions of profitability
(i.e., operating profits vs. net income), and also control for
capital structure (Leverage) and the liquidity of company
assets (Liquidity). We do so as we follow managerial ratio-
nales highlighted during the due diligence process
(Lebedow, 1999; McGrady, 2005), where decision makers
revise particularly the bottom line of accounting figures to
see how profitable the companies are after debt obligations
(interests) and government duties (income taxes) (see
e.g., Martin & Shalev, 2017). Moreover, managers would
not prefer to see a high proportion of (idle) fixed assets
shown on the targets' balance sheet. The results are
reported in Table 7 and show that the regression coeffi-
cients obtained in Table 6 keep their statistical significance
and signs.
Second, we use alternatives to the economic freedom
index. Berggren and Jordahl (2005) and Nyström (2008),
among others, mention property rights, and judiciary and
courts impartiality to measure the quality of legal and
institutional environment of countries. Feito-Ruiz
et al. (2014) refer to the importance of these aspects in
M&A deals and in deciding whether to acquire listed or
unlisted firms; we extend their work and strengthen their
empirical results that reveal the role of various legal and
institutional environments. As defined in Table A1 with
details, we therefore construct two variables: Legal protec-
tion and Property rights. The corresponding results
reported in Table 8 show that our Hypothesis 1 continues
to hold albeit with statistically less significant coeffi-
cients. Further, as the coefficients on Target legal are sig-
nificant, we confirm our Hypothesis 2 that higher
economic freedom in the target firm's country reduces
the occurrence of cancelled M&A deal announcements.
Third, following the discussion in Martynova and
Renneboog (2008), Bris and Cabolis (2008) referring to
the shareholder protection and merger premium for
cross-border deals, and Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-
Requejo (2011), we run the regressions across the sub-
samples of cross-border and domestic M&As. We report
these analyses in Table 9. The findings do not support




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26 ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL.
separately as cross-border and domestic does not yield
supporting results for this hypothesis. For Hypothesis 2,
on the other hand, there is mixed evidence as in half of
the cases, we report significant and negative coefficients
although all the coefficients are associated with negative
signs. Our results are consistent with the implications of
Bris and Cabolis (2008), and we extend their work based
on 39 countries by focusing on the cancelled deals and
the economic freedom index associated with legal envi-
ronment using a much larger sample, and independent
and control variables.
Fourth, our paper examines different time-periods.
We initially compare the latest global financial crisis
years (2007–2009) with non-crisis years (1977–2014). The
detailed results based on two sub-samples in Table 10
reveal that we confirm our Hypotheses 1 and 2 only dur-
ing tranquil non-crisis years. Similarly, in Table 11,
instead of providing sub-sample analyses, we use the
M&A waves' periods (i.e., 1981–1989, 1993–2000 and
2002–2007) (see e.g., Martynova & Renneboog, 2006),
and the financial crisis as binary control variables. These
results using the full sample generally support both
Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Fifth, the sub-sample analyses of financial versus
non-financial firms in Table 12 do not convincingly sup-
port our hypotheses although we do not report any find-
ing that is against these hypotheses. In specific, Models
7 and 8, and partly Models 3 and 4 show that Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2 are supported for the non-financial corporate
sector only.
Finally, financing M&A deals is an essential aspect of
completed deals. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show
that firms tend to use debt financing for takeovers in
countries where the cost of equity is substantially higher
due to inadequate shareholder protection. For firms oper-
ating in countries where financial markets are not devel-
oped, liquidity can be a constraint in going ahead with
the deal. In other words, in an environment where finan-
cial markets are relatively underdeveloped and investors'
protection rights are low, external financing can be costly
or challenging to obtain. Similar issues are discussed in
Feito-Ruiz et al. (2014), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007),
and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2003). We extend
these studies with a different focus and larger sample
size. Following Didier, Levine, and Schmukler (2015),
among others, we split our sample into the countries with
underdeveloped versus developed financial markets
depending on the strength of their credit markets and
stock markets (see Table A1). Table 13 shows that there
is a clear distinction between the two sub-samples: the
coefficients regarding the economic freedom or legal
aspects are generally insignificant if the announced deal




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28 ATTAH-BOAKYE ET AL.
markets. In one case (columns 5 and 6), the positive coef-
ficient on Target legal is significant and positive. How-
ever, in the case of the developed financial markets, both
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are consistently supported. These
findings highlight the importance of country characteris-
tics concerning the M&A deals withdrawal. Our findings
are parallel to the results of Officer (2007): where the
information asymmetry problem is greater, there are
higher chances of deal withdrawals. Our study extends
Officer's (2007) findings by showing that information
transparency rather than profitability is a crucial determi-
nant of M&A deals acceptance.
In Table 14, we use binary controls (i.e., Acquirer
underdeveloped and target underdeveloped) for the status
of the target and acquirer firm's financial market devel-
opment using the full sample. These final sets of the
results are qualitatively the same as with our main find-
ings and generally support Hypotheses 1 and 2.
6 | DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
In an effort to introduce other perspectives to the M&As
studies, this paper showed a different research frame-
work to investigate the factors causing the withdrawal of
the deals from 1977 to 2014 for 147 countries. Overall, we
find that the economic freedom index, corporate size,
and profitability do affect the propensity not to go ahead
with the announced M&As deals.
We find that the acquirer's country economic freedom
index is positively associated with the probability of the
M&As withdrawal. This finding is in line with Pablo (2009)
who finds a negative link between acquires' property rights
and cross-border completions, implying that the higher
the acquirer's economic freedom index, the higher the like-
lihood of a deal's withdrawal. This finding suggests that
the acquirers are more aware of M&As risks and costs,
information asymmetries, and also market and economic
environments where companies belong to. Another impli-
cation of our key finding would be that the incumbent
management of the target firms could assess in advance to
what extent the initial offer made by the acquiring firm
should be taken seriously depending on their country of
origin. Our results further suggest that the economic free-
dom index for the target's country is generally negatively
linked with the probability of the M&As withdrawal.
The robustness analyses (e.g., alternative constructs
to the economic freedom index and controlling for the
M&A waves) using the full sample confirm the main
findings. However, the sub-sample analyses yield alter-
nating results: Our hypotheses are supported (a) for the
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TABLE 14 Factors influencing M&As deal withdrawals: controlling for underdeveloped financial markets using the full sample








Acquirer legal 3.246* 0.195* 0.310** 0.0179** 0.208* 0.0120*
(1.856) (0.111) (0.132) (0.00766) (0.122) (0.00705)
Target legal −1.782 −0.107 −0.327** −0.0189** −0.229* −0.0133*
(1.364) (0.0817) (0.132) (0.00762) (0.119) (0.00689)
Acquirer underdeveloped 1.680* 0.101* 1.746* 0.101* 1.514 0.0876
(0.987) (0.0592) (0.922) (0.0533) (0.972) (0.0563)
Target underdeveloped 0.190 0.0114 −0.583 −0.0337 −0.245 −0.0142
(1.183) (0.0709) (1.297) (0.0750) (1.243) (0.0719)
Acquirer size_assets −0.201*** −0.0120*** −0.208*** −0.0120*** −0.206*** −0.0119***
(0.0357) (0.00212) (0.0378) (0.00216) (0.0378) (0.00216)
Target size_assets 0.193*** 0.0116*** 0.205*** 0.0118*** 0.204*** 0.0118***
(0.0579) (0.00347) (0.0632) (0.00366) (0.0633) (0.00366)
Acquirer profitability_EBITDA 0.00638 0.000383 0.00837 0.000484 0.00904 0.000523
(0.00572) (0.000343) (0.0116) (0.000674) (0.0108) (0.000624)
Target profitability_EBITDA −0.0136 −0.000817 −0.0139 −0.000804 −0.0134 −0.000773
(0.0112) (0.000669) (0.0115) (0.000663) (0.0116) (0.000668)
Friendly −3.027*** −0.181*** −3.016*** −0.174*** −3.023*** −0.175***
(0.183) (0.0105) (0.196) (0.0108) (0.196) (0.0108)
Hostile −0.574** −0.0344** −0.442* −0.0256* −0.460* −0.0266*
(0.242) (0.0145) (0.265) (0.0153) (0.265) (0.0153)
Neutral −3.601*** −0.216*** −3.524*** −0.204*** −3.529*** −0.204***
(0.279) (0.0164) (0.292) (0.0166) (0.292) (0.0166)
Cash −0.112 −0.00673 0.0267 0.00155 0.0122 0.000708
(0.126) (0.00753) (0.139) (0.00803) (0.138) (0.00801)
Stock 0.231 0.0138 0.421*** 0.0243*** 0.418*** 0.0242***
(0.145) (0.00869) (0.161) (0.00930) (0.160) (0.00930)
Hybrid −0.199 −0.0119 −0.0397 −0.00229 −0.0439 −0.00254
(0.175) (0.0105) (0.189) (0.0109) (0.188) (0.0109)
Cross-border 0.0169 0.00101 0.0243 0.00140 0.0251 0.00145
(0.126) (0.00756) (0.134) (0.00774) (0.134) (0.00778)
Vertical 0.0254 0.00152 0.0469 0.00271 0.0397 0.00230
(0.126) (0.00755) (0.141) (0.00813) (0.140) (0.00809)
Deal size 0.188*** 0.0113*** 0.170*** 0.00984*** 0.169*** 0.00977***
(0.0602) (0.00360) (0.0654) (0.00377) (0.0653) (0.00377)
Ownership 0.0121*** 0.000726*** 0.0113*** 0.000654*** 0.0113*** 0.000652***
(0.00242) (0.000145) (0.00263) (0.000152) (0.00262) (0.000152)
Leverage −0.198 −0.0119 −0.0575 −0.00333 −0.0531 −0.00307
(0.212) (0.0127) (0.229) (0.0132) (0.227) (0.0131)
Constant −3.350 0.0328 0.0576
(3.371) (1.053) (0.866)
Observations 7,632 7,632 6,803 6,803 6,803 6,803
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with the latest financial crisis times, and (c) in environ-
ments where there are developed financial markets.
The likelihood of the failure of an M&As deal
decreases when the size of the acquiring firm gets larger
but it increases when the size of the target firm gets
larger. This shows that firm size impacts significantly
deal failures, which might be related to assets' movement
from low to high productivity level as the efficiency the-
ory professes (Garzella & Fiorentino, 2014; Tirole, 2006),
and corporate attributes (target or acquirer) associated
with decision makers' skills and capabilities from the
knowledge-based perspective (Junni et al., 2015).
Furthermore, M&As deals are less prone to fail if the
target firm's profitability is higher. However, our analyses
showed that an acquiring firm's profitability exerts no sig-
nificant influence on this propensity. This aspect is associ-
ated with high expected synergies, which are essential for
M&As deals as a vehicle to create value for shareholders
through assets movements (Garzella & Fiorentino, 2014).
Regarding the deal characteristics, aligned with the
previous studies, the results show that using stocks as
mean of payments (Gorbenko & Malenko, 2014),
unfriendly deals (Moschieri & Campa, 2014), seeking high
percentage of targets' shares to purchase (Bajo et al., 2013)
or high deal size (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004) increase the
probability of having a failed M&As deal. It seems that
offering stocks instead of financing the deals via cash or
debt does not favour the deal as this might probably sat-
isfies neither bidding nor target firms' shareholders due to
the various reasons including uncertainty, loss of control
and dilution in ownership if the deal is completed.
The main implication of our study for decision
makers is that there are two key firm-specific factors
(i.e., size and profitability) and the quality of the coun-
tries' economic and legal environment that significantly
affect the outcome of an M&A deal. Also, how the bidder
approaches the target, the payment method, and the deal
size all tend to be significant factors.
Because of lack of information, the current study was
unable to analyse whether the role of voting process
(Burch, Morgan, & Wolf, 2004), persistence of acquirers
role (natural bidders) across time (Coleman, Cotei, &
Farhat, 2010), and influence of internal corporate gover-
nance mechanisms (Liu, Padgett, & Varotto, 2017; Wang &
Xie, 2009) would affect deal failure. Finally, aspects like
quality of accounting reports and role of legal and financial
advisors would merit further research.
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1 China has attempts to tighten the cross-border M&As rules regard-
ing deal approval process following renminbi's recent depreciation
and fall in their forex reserves (Financial Times, 29th November
2016); and Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund of China had to
drop its bid to acquire Aixtron (chip equipment maker) of Germany
after it failed to obtain the required approvals from the U.S. due to
security grounds (Reuters, 8th December 2016).
2 See Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Hagedoorn and
Sadowski (1999), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Buehler, Kaiser, and
Jaeger (2006), Capron and Guillén (2009), Pablo (2009), Behr and
Heid (2011), Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012), Martin and
Shalev (2017) and McNichols and Stubben (2015), among others.
Chikhouni, Edwards, and Farashahi (2017) use “acquirer size” as
a factor in explaining the acquired ownership.
3 Additionally, in the Appendix, Table A2 (panel A) discloses the
distribution of deals' status across targets' and acquirers' industry
and across regions; Table A2 (panel B) displays the deals' status
between domestic and cross-borders transactions, means of pay-
ments, and deals attitude; and Table A3 lists acquirers' and tar-
gets' deals for each country.
4 We also use the alternative definition based on the number of
employees, which is available only for targets, to consider in the
TABLE 14 (Continued)








Pseudo R2 0.281 0.284 0.283
F/Wald statistic 910*** 805*** 803***
Note: The dependent variable isWithdrawn. Acquirer legal or Target legal is Acquirer freedom or Target freedom (Models 1–2); Legal protection
(Models 3–4) or Property rights (Models 5–6) in the acquirer's or target's country of origin. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation are in the parentheses *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. Time, industry and country dummies are included in all models. All
firm-specific factors are measured for the year preceding the announcement year. See Table A1 for the definition of the variables.
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regression models. The results (unreported but available on
request) are qualitatively the same across the three definitions.
5 When we use the probit method, the quality of the regression
results does not change.
6 According to the deals synopsis and decision makers rationale dis-
closed by the data provider, negative values in profitability can high-
light inefficient use of assets; making those companies easy targets,
and influencing asset movements and deals' completion or with-
drawal. Thus, we do not consider winsorizing or trimming our data
in order not to lose important information embedded in such values.
7 We also constructed the “differenced” economic freedom index
between the target and bidding firms' countries. In untabulated
results, we did not find significant regression coefficients for this
construct.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1 Definition of the variables
Variables Definitions Sign
Withdrawn Dummy variable (dependent variable): 1 if the deal is withdrawn (i.e., the
target or acquirer has terminated their agreement, letter of intent, or
plans for the acquisition or merger); 0, if the deal is completed and
closed.
N/A
Acquirer freedom The acquirer's economic freedom index. The index, from the Fraser
Institute, synthetizes different economic freedom perspectives across 24
criteria related to size of government, legal system and security of
property rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and
regulation. The index ranges from 0 to 10 and higher values indicate
higher freedom (http://www.freetheworld.com/).
+
Target freedom The target's economic freedom index with the range of 0–10; higher
values indicate higher freedom (http://www.freetheworld.com/).
−
Legal protection Proxy for the legal and institutional environment in the acquiring or
target firm's country based on the judiciary and courts impartiality
reducing regulatory favouritism: the quality legal framework allows
private businesses settling disputes and challenges while reducing
manipulation and increasing neutrality. This criterion ranges from 0 to




Property rights Proxy for investors' protection based on the protection of property rights
in the acquiring or target firm's country. It provides information on
market operations and efficiency where individuals have secured their
rights to investment and property. This construct ranges from 0 to 10






Dummy variable: 1 if the sum of credit market development (i.e., lending
from domestic banks to private non-financial sector over GDP) and
stock market development (i.e., stock market capitalization to GDP) is
lower than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Namely, 1 means the
country for the acquirer or target has underdeveloped financial
markets, and 0 refers to the developed markets.
+(−) for acquirer
(target)
Crisis Dummy variable: 1 for the years between 2007 and 2009; 0, otherwise. +/−




Acquirer size_assets Natural logarithm of the acquirer's deflated total assets in million USD. −
Target size_assets Natural logarithm of the target's deflated total assets in million USD. +
Acquirer size_sales Natural logarithm of the acquirer's deflated net sales in million USD. −
Target size_sales Natural logarithm of the target's deflated net sales in million USD. +
Acquirer profitability_EBITDA Acquirer's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortization
(EBITDA) over total assets.
−
Target profitability_EBITDA Target's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortization
(EBITDA) over total assets.
+
Acquirer profitability_net income Acquirer's net income from continuing operations, after taxes and
minority interest, before extraordinary items and preferred dividends
divided by total assets.
−
(Continues)
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
Variables Definitions Sign
Target profitability_net income Target's net income from continuing operations, after taxes and minority
interest, before extraordinary items and preferred dividends divided by
total assets.
+
Liquidity Ratio of target's cash and marketable securities to total assets.
Information is not available for the acquirer.
+/−




Friendly Dummy variable: 1 if the company's management/directors recommend
the offer; 0, otherwise.
−
Hostile Dummy variable: 1 if the company's management/directors officially
reject the offer, but the acquirer continues with the takeover; 0,
otherwise.
+
Neutral Dummy variable: 1 if the company's management/directors have nothing
to do with the transaction; 0, otherwise. When constructing this deal
attitude measure and the two just above, the other cases such as the
attitude of the board is not applicable (e.g., splits and spin offs) and
unsolicited (the offer is a surprise to the target's board and has not yet
been given a recommendation) are also considered. In the regressions,
we are therefore able to use three dummy variables out of five groups
regarding deals attitude.
+/−
Cross-border Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is cross-border (i.e., the target company or
assets being sold is not located in the same country as the acquirer's); 0,
otherwise.
+
Vertical Dummy variable: 1 if the acquirer's industry is different from the target's
industry, that is, vertical integration.
+
Deal size Natural logarithm of deflated deal value, in million USD, paid by the
acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. It includes the amount paid for
all common stocks and equivalent, preferred stock, debt, options,
assets, warrants, and stock purchases made within 6 months of the
announcement date of the transaction.
+
Ownership Percentage of common stocks and equivalent outstanding of the target
sought by the acquirer.
+
Methods of payment:
Cash Dummy variable: 1 if the transaction of the deal is via cash only as a
payment method (i.e., cash, earn-out or assumption of liabilities, or any
combination of the three); 0, otherwise.
−
Stock Dummy variable: 1 if the transaction of the deal is via stocks only as a
payment method; 0, otherwise.
+
Hybrid Dummy variable: 1 if the transaction of the deal is via cash and stocks as
payment methods (i.e., one of either of cash, earn-out, or assumption of
liabilities and the other types of stocks); 0, otherwise. When
constructing this mean of payment measure and the two just above, the
other cases such as “unknown” (this includes deals where the values
for each type of consideration are unknown) and “others” (any
combination excluding cash only, stock only and hybrid) are also
considered. In the regressions, we are therefore able to use three
dummy variables out of four groups regarding payment methods.
+/−
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TABLE A2 Acquirers' and targets' industries and regions (Panel A); and deal activity by cross-border, mean of payments and deal
attitude (Panel B)
Panel A Panel B
Deal activity TDC TDW TDA %DW TDC TDW TDA %DW
Acquirer industry: Domestic 74,535 2,686 77,221 3.5
Consumer products & services 7,972 148 8,120 1.8 Cross-border 57,899 1,998 59,897 3.3
Consumer staples 7,743 260 8,003 3.2 Payment methods
Energy and power 11,309 407 11,716 3.5 Cash 29,210 1,205 30,415 4.0
Financials 33,999 1,385 35,384 3.9 Stock 4,178 328 4,506 7.3
Government & agencies 291 15 306 4.9 Hybrid 3,069 278 3,347 40.6
Healthcare 6,209 165 6,374 2.6 Other means
undisclosed
95,977 2,873 98,850 5.7
High technology 13,138 255 13,393 1.9 Deals attitude
Industrials 16,562 617 17,179 3.6 Friendly 120,506 3,559 124,065 2.9
Materials 13,716 636 14,352 4.4 Hostile 154 235 389 60.4
Media and entertainment 7,362 257 7,619 3.4 Neutral 8,367 241 8,608 2.8
Real estate 5,449 131 5,580 2.3 Not applicable 3,356 368 3,724 9.9
Retail 4,140 140 4,280 3.3 Unsolicited 51 281 332 84.6




10,756 173 10,929 1.6
Consumer staples 8,451 280 8,731 3.2
Energy and power 12,551 475 13,026 3.6
Financials 16,974 808 17,782 4.5
Government and agencies 81 3 84 3.6
Healthcare 7,159 192 7,351 2.6
High technology 16,992 344 17,336 2.0
Industrials 18,552 703 19,255 3.7
Materials 15,737 744 16,481 4.5
Media and entertainment 8,570 329 8,899 3.7
Real estate 6,724 167 6,891 2.4
Retail 5,468 178 5,646 3.2




2,371 108 2,479 4.4
Americas 54,626 2,024 56,650 3.6
Asia-Pacific
(Ex Central Asia)
15,756 884 16,640 5.3
Europe 48,174 1,442 49,616 2.9
Supranational 19 1 20 5.0




2,946 128 3,074 4.2
(Continues)
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TABLE A2 (Continued)
Panel A Panel B
Deal activity TDC TDW TDA %DW TDC TDW TDA %DW
Americas 53,504 2,010 55,514 3.6
Asia-Pacific (Ex Central Asia) 19,498 997 20,495 4.9
Europe 48,118 1,414 49,532 2.9
Supranational 4 1 5 20.0
Note: TDC is total number of deals completed; TDW is total number of deals withdrawn; TDA is total number of deals announced; %DW is
the proportion of deals withdrawn. We followed the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) in Panel A. The deals consider
bidders from both public and private targeting listed companies.
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TABLE A3 Acquirers' and targets' deal details across countries
Target Acquirer
TDC TDW TDA %DW TDC TDW TDA %DW
Afghanistan 1 1 2 50.0% 3 0 3 0.0%
Albania 8 0 8 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Algeria 20 0 20 0.0% 9 0 9 0.0%
American Samoa 2 0 2 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Andorra 2 0 2 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Angola 20 1 21 4.8% 7 0 7 0.0%
Anguilla 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Argentina 694 22 716 3.1% 221 7 228 3.1%
Armenia 17 0 17 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Aruba 2 1 3 33.3% 0 0 0 0.0%
Australia 5,728 340 6,068 5.6% 5,136 270 5,406 5.0%
Austria 672 33 705 4.7% 765 24 789 3.0%
Azerbaijan 12 1 13 7.7% 3 0 3 0.0%
Bahamas 28 1 29 3.4% 29 0 29 0.0%
Bahrain 14 1 15 6.7% 26 2 28 7.1%
Bangladesh 21 0 21 0.0% 4 0 4 0.0%
Barbados 14 1 15 6.7% 11 0 11 0.0%
Belarus 32 1 33 3.0% 6 1 7 14.3%
Belgium 1,109 33 1,142 2.9% 1,079 28 1,107 2.5%
Belize 4 0 4 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Benin 2 0 2 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Bermuda 117 4 121 3.3% 181 8 189 4.2%
Bolivia 44 1 45 2.2% 16 0 16 0.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 16 0 16 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Botswana 15 0 15 0.0% 6 0 6 0.0%
Brazil 2,449 60 2,509 2.4% 1,504 47 1,551 3.0%
British Virgin Islands 31 0 31 0.0% 61 8 69 11.6%
Brunei 7 0 7 0.0% 4 0 4 0.0%
Bulgaria 167 7 174 4.0% 33 1 34 2.9%
Burkina Faso 7 0 7 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Cambodia 18 1 19 5.3% 5 0 5 0.0%
Cameroon 12 0 12 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Canada 5,680 282 5,962 4.7% 5,650 298 5,948 5.0%
Cape Verde 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Cayman Islands 44 1 45 2.2% 62 0 62 0.0%
Chad 2 0 2 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Chile 553 26 579 4.5% 307 12 319 3.8%
China 2,218 62 2,280 2.7% 1,185 63 1,248 5.0%
Colombia 314 8 322 2.5% 174 0 174 0.0%
Costa Rica 31 1 32 3.1% 4 0 4 0.0%
Croatia 97 2 99 2.0% 29 0 29 0.0%
Cuba 3 0 3 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
(Continues)
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TABLE A3 (Continued)
Target Acquirer
TDC TDW TDA %DW TDC TDW TDA %DW
Cyprus 78 3 81 3.7% 146 7 153 4.6%
Czech Republic 582 10 592 1.7% 229 6 235 2.6%
Czechoslovakia 23 9 32 28.1% 0 0 0 0.0%
Dem Rep of the Congo 7 0 7 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Denmark 886 15 901 1.7% 810 19 829 2.3%
Dominican Republic 32 1 33 3.0% 10 0 10 0.0%
East Germany 5 3 8 37.5% 0 0 0 0.0%
Ecuador 47 1 48 2.1% 8 0 8 0.0%
Egypt 162 6 168 3.6% 73 3 76 3.9%
El Salvador 36 0 36 0.0% 3 0 3 0.0%
Equatorial Guinea 5 0 5 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Eritrea 1 0 1 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Estonia 133 4 137 2.9% 44 2 46 4.3%
Ethiopia 5 0 5 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Falkland Islands 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Faroe Islands 2 0 2 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Federated St. Micronesia 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Fiji 12 1 13 7.7% 2 1 3 33.3%
Finland 1,122 25 1,147 2.2% 1,114 29 1,143 2.5%
France 5,236 118 5,354 2.2% 5,886 155 6,041 2.6%
French Polynesia 0 0 0 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Gabon 13 1 14 7.1% 2 0 2 0.0%
Georgia 18 0 18 0.0% 5 0 5 0.0%
Germany 6,427 167 6,594 2.5% 6,231 207 6,438 3.2%
Ghana 35 2 37 5.4% 15 0 15 0.0%
Gibraltar 9 1 10 10.0% 14 1 15 6.7%
Greece 348 18 366 4.9% 312 18 330 5.5%
Greenland 3 0 3 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Guadeloupe 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Guam 4 0 4 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Guatemala 37 0 37 0.0% 5 0 5 0.0%
Guernsey 19 1 20 5.0% 105 0 105 0.0%
Guinea 8 0 8 0.0% 3 0 3 0.0%
Guyana 11 1 12 8.3% 1 0 1 0.0%
Haiti 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Honduras 7 0 7 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Hong Kong 1,518 89 1,607 5.5% 1,761 106 1,867 5.7%
Hungary 457 16 473 3.4% 209 8 217 3.7%
Iceland 22 0 22 0.0% 46 2 48 4.2%
India 2,120 64 2,184 2.9% 1,324 57 1,381 4.1%
Indonesia 689 64 753 8.5% 307 37 344 10.8%
Iran 5 0 5 0.0% 3 0 3 0.0%
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TABLE A3 (Continued)
Target Acquirer
TDC TDW TDA %DW TDC TDW TDA %DW
Iraq 22 0 22 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Isle of Man 26 2 28 7.1% 19 1 20 5.0%
Israel 450 28 478 5.9% 318 25 343 7.3%
Italy 2,799 93 2,892 3.2% 2,210 90 2,300 3.9%
Ivory Coast 16 2 18 11.1% 6 0 6 0.0%
Jamaica 19 1 20 5.0% 5 0 5 0.0%
Japan 8,363 133 8,496 1.6% 10,176 174 10,350 1.7%
Jersey 40 1 41 2.4% 54 1 55 1.8%
Jordan 33 0 33 0.0% 18 1 19 5.3%
Kazakhstan 94 9 103 8.7% 39 4 43 9.3%
Kenya 39 2 41 4.9% 11 0 11 0.0%
Kiribati 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Kuwait 24 3 27 11.1% 50 3 53 5.7%
Kyrgyzstan 12 2 14 14.3% 0 0 0 0.0%
Laos 16 0 16 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Latvia 77 3 80 3.8% 26 1 27 3.7%
Lebanon 25 3 28 10.7% 16 1 17 5.9%
Liberia 4 0 4 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Libya 6 1 7 14.3% 1 0 1 0.0%
Liechtenstein 10 1 11 9.1% 9 0 9 0.0%
Lithuania 116 2 118 1.7% 39 0 39 0.0%
Luxembourg 163 7 170 4.1% 328 13 341 3.8%
Macau 12 0 12 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Macedonia 18 0 18 0.0% 3 0 3 0.0%
Madagascar 2 0 2 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Malawi 2 0 2 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Malaysia 1,032 94 1,126 8.3% 936 80 1,016 7.9%
Maldives 3 0 3 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Mali 9 0 9 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Malta 15 0 15 0.0% 8 0 8 0.0%
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Martinque 3 0 3 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Mauritania 9 0 9 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Mauritius 19 1 20 5.0% 101 3 104 2.9%
Mexico 793 43 836 5.1% 429 27 456 5.9%
Moldova 17 0 17 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Monaco 19 0 19 0.0% 8 0 8 0.0%
Mongolia 18 1 19 5.3% 2 0 2 0.0%
Montenegro 7 0 7 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Morocco 69 0 69 0.0% 30 0 30 0.0%
Mozambique 21 0 21 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Myanmar 10 1 11 9.1% 1 0 1 0.0%
(Continues)
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TABLE A3 (Continued)
Target Acquirer
TDC TDW TDA %DW TDC TDW TDA %DW
N. Mariana Islands 2 0 2 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Namibia 32 0 32 0.0% 11 0 11 0.0%
Nepal 7 0 7 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Netherlands 2,146 79 2,225 3.6% 3,073 87 3,160 2.8%
Netherlands Antilles 15 0 15 0.0% 8 1 9 11.1%
New Caledonia 5 0 5 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
New Zealand 873 42 915 4.6% 476 26 502 5.2%
Nicaragua 17 1 18 5.6% 2 0 2 0.0%
Niger 3 0 3 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Nigeria 57 2 59 3.4% 25 0 25 0.0%
North Korea 2 0 2 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Norway 1,033 55 1,088 5.1% 905 38 943 4.0%
Oman 36 3 39 7.7% 30 4 34 11.8%
Pakistan 60 10 70 14.3% 20 4 24 16.7%
Panama 54 0 54 0.0% 32 1 33 3.0%
Papua New Guinea 51 8 59 13.6% 14 2 16 12.5%
Paraguay 22 1 23 4.3% 5 0 5 0.0%
Peru 285 12 297 4.0% 123 0 123 0.0%
Philippines 573 24 597 4.0% 398 13 411 3.2%
Poland 948 37 985 3.8% 462 19 481 4.0%
Portugal 611 32 643 5.0% 517 26 543 4.8%
Puerto Rico 86 3 89 3.4% 35 0 35 0.0%
Qatar 18 0 18 0.0% 51 2 53 3.8%
Republic of Congo 9 0 9 0.0% 4 0 4 0.0%
Republic of Ireland 577 22 599 3.7% 787 26 813 3.2%
Reunion 3 0 3 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Romania 259 8 267 3.0% 49 0 49 0.0%
Russian Federation 2,564 50 2,614 1.9% 2,174 50 2,224 2.2%
Rwanda 7 0 7 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
San Marino 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Saudi Arabia 55 2 57 3.5% 57 5 62 8.1%
Senegal 4 0 4 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Serbia 41 1 42 2.4% 9 0 9 0.0%
Serbia & Montenegro 30 1 31 3.2% 1 0 1 0.0%
Seychelles 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Sierra Leone 3 0 3 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Singapore 1,364 64 1,428 4.5% 1,720 102 1,822 5.6%
Slovak Republic 111 7 118 5.9% 29 0 29 0.0%
Slovenia 38 1 39 2.6% 16 0 16 0.0%
Solomon Islands 3 0 3 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Somalia 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
South Africa 1,221 48 1,269 3.8% 1,262 42 1,304 3.2%
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TABLE A3 (Continued)
Target Acquirer
TDC TDW TDA %DW TDC TDW TDA %DW
South Korea 1,453 66 1,519 4.3% 1,329 65 1,394 4.7%
Soviet Union 2 0 2 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Spain 3,022 76 3,098 2.5% 2,381 68 2,449 2.8%
Sri Lanka 56 0 56 0.0% 23 0 23 0.0%
St Barthelemy 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
St Kitts and Nevis 1 0 1 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Sudan 14 0 14 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Surinam 4 0 4 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Swaziland 5 0 5 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Sweden 2,267 43 2,310 1.9% 2,994 67 3,061 2.2%
Switzerland 1,524 36 1,560 2.3% 2,319 71 2,390 3.0%
Syria 3 1 4 25.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Taiwan 592 29 621 4.7% 525 34 559 6.1%
Tajikistan 0 1 1 100.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Tanzania 18 0 18 0.0% 2 0 2 0.0%
Thailand 813 31 844 3.7% 538 21 559 3.8%
Togo 4 0 4 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Tonga 3 0 3 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Trinidad and Tobago 23 2 25 8.0% 4 1 5 20.0%
Tunisia 28 0 28 0.0% 6 0 6 0.0%
Turkey 577 26 603 4.3% 258 17 275 6.2%
Tuvalu 0 0 0 0.0% 0 1 1 100.0%
Turkmenistan 3 0 3 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
US Virgin Islands 1 0 1 0.0% 2 1 3 33.3%
Uganda 12 1 13 7.7% 3 0 3 0.0%
Ukraine 180 7 187 3.7% 47 0 47 0.0%
United Arab Emirates 113 2 115 1.7% 140 12 152 7.9%
United Kingdom 11,400 357 11,757 3.0% 12,379 359 12,738 2.8%
United States of America 41,834 1,531 43,365 3.5% 45,669 1,612 47,281 3.4%
Uruguay 49 1 50 2.0% 13 0 13 0.0%
Uzbekistan 12 1 13 7.7% 1 0 1 0.0%
Vanuatu 1 0 1 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Venezuela 115 4 119 3.4% 48 1 49 2.0%
Vietnam 208 5 213 2.3% 29 2 31 6.5%
Western Samoa 1 0 1 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Yemen 9 1 10 10.0% 2 1 3 33.3%
Zaire 0 0 0 0.0% 1 0 1 0.0%
Yugoslavia 7 1 8 12.5% 0 0 0 0.0%
Zambia 17 1 18 5.6% 2 0 2 0.0%
Zimbabwe 39 2 41 4.9% 21 0 21 0.0%
Note: TDC is the total number of deals completed; TDW is the total number of deals withdrawn; TDA is the total number of deals
announced; %DW is the proportion of deals withdrawn.
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